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Abstract—We consider the problem of obfuscating sensitive
information while preserving utility. Given that an analytical
solution is often not feasible because of un-scalability and because
the background knowledge may be too complicated to determine,
we propose an approach based on machine learning, inspired
by the GANs (Generative Adversarial Networks) paradigm. The
idea is to set up two nets: the generator, that tries to produce
an optimal obfuscation mechanism to protect the data, and the
classifier, that tries to de-obfuscate the data. By letting the two
nets compete against each other, the mechanism improves its
degree of protection, until an equilibrium is reached. We apply
our method to the case of location privacy, and we perform
experiments on synthetic data and on real data from the Gowalla
dataset. We evaluate the privacy of the mechanism not only
by its capacity to defeat the classifier, but also in terms of the
Bayes error, which represents the strongest possible adversary.
We compare the privacy-utility tradeoff of our method with that
of the planar Laplace mechanism used in geo-indistinguishability,
showing favorable results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Big data are the lifeblood of modern economy and, con-
sequently, there is an enormous interest in collecting all sort
of personal information. Individuals, on the other hand, are
often willing to provide their data in exchange of improved
services and experiences. However, with big data comes big
concern about privacy: a person who makes a daily use of
connected devices and social media may disclose a huge
amount of detailed and accurate information, which could later
on be used against him or her. It could affect everything from
relationships to getting a job, or qualifying for a loan, or worse.
The rise of machine learning, with its capability of per-
forming powerful analytics on massive amounts of data, has
further exacerbated the threaths to privacy. To illustrate the
point, consider the following scenario: some users send their
identities and coordinates to a Location Based Service (LBS)
to obtain some kind of assistance, for instance the points
of interest (POIs) near them. An attacker that has access to
the LBS could collect the traces of these users for a while,
and use machine learning techniques and some background
knowledge (for instance the home address of the users) to infer
information from them. For example, he could train a machine
to classify traces, to associate a class to a home address and
therefore to a user, and also to connect a trace outset to its
possible continuations. Later on, the attacker could use the
machine to identify the user from a new trace (even if the
trace does not contain the home address), or to predict the
likely next location the user will visit.
Nonetheless, if machine learning can be a threat, it can also
be a powerful mean to build good privacy protection mecha-
nisms. We envision the possibility of deploying a machine that
counters the attack, and that is able to learn the best defense
strategy by interacting with the adversary.
In this paper we focus on defense mechanisms based on
data obfuscation by addition of controlled noise. Now, clearly
more noise means more privacy, but it is important to note
that, in general, privacy is not the only concern: a good
defense must not only prevent the attacker from discovering
sensitive information, but also disclose what is needed to get
the desired quality of service. In the example above, the user
may report to the LBS an obfuscated location, but still he
or she expects a service in return, and the quality of service
(QoS) usually degrades with the amount of obfuscation. For
instance, reporting a fixed location, or a randomly chosen one,
would guarantee privacy, but would result in a very low utility,
because the obtained POIs would be close to the reported
location, which would usually be far from the real one.
The trade-off between privacy and utility is one of the
main challenges in design of privacy mechanisms. In this
paper, following the approach of [1], we aim at maximizing
the privacy protection while preserving the desired QoS1, i.e.
the expected utility loss must remain below some tolerance
threshold with respect to a chosen metric. We focus on the
example of location privacy and in particular on the issue
of re-identification of the user from his location, but the
framework that we develop is general and can be applied
to any situation in which an attacker might infer sensitive
information from accessible correlated data.
The optimal trade-off between privacy and utility can in
principles be achieved with linear programming. This problem
can in fact be thought of as a linear optimization problem
where the privacy is the objective function and the threshold
on utility is the constraint. The limitation of this approach,
however, is that it does not scale to large datasets: the
existing tools cannot handle more than a few hundreds possible
locations. Furthermore, the background knowledge and the
1Other approaches to location privacy take the opposite view, and aim at
maximizing utility while achieving the desired amount of privacy, see for
instance [2].
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correlation between data points affect privacy and they are
usually difficult to determine and express formally.
Our position is that machine learning can be the solution to
this problem. Inspired by the GANs paradigm [3], we propose
a system consisting of two neural networks: a generator G and
a classifier C . The idea is that G generates noise so to confuse
the adversary as much as possible, within the boundaries
allowed by the utility requirement, while C inputs the noisy
locations produced by G and tries to learn how to re-identify
the corresponding user. In other words, C tries to build a
classification function, where the obfuscated locations are the
features, and the users’ ids are the labels. The classification
produced by C is then fed back to G , which uses it to regulate
the noise injection. While fighting against C , G learns to
produce a more and more “clever” noise function, until it
reaches a point where it cannot improve any longer.
A main difference between our approach and the GANs is
that the GANs have access to a dataset sampled from the distri-
bution that G should learn to reproduce. The adversary, which
in that case is called D (discriminator), tries to distinguish
between the real data (from the dataset) and those generated
by G . The net G then “learns” the target distribution from the
feedback provided by D . In our case, on the contrary, there is
no dataset of samples that can “direct” G towards an optimal
noise distribution. In a sense, our G has to be more “creative”
and “invent” a good distribution from scratch.
A major challenge in our setting is represented by the choice
of the target function. To illustrate the issue, let us explain in
more detail the ideas behind our approach. The goal of G is to
achieve the optimal privacy-utility tradeoff. Concerning utility,
we can formalize it as the expected distance between the real
location and the obfuscated one2. This is a typical definition
in location privacy (see for instance [1], [2], [5], [6]), and
captures the fact that location based services usually offer a
better quality of service when they are provided with a more
accurate location. Concerning privacy, a first idea would be
to measure it in terms of C ’s misclassification, since we are
trying to prevent the attacker from associating a location to
the corresponding user. Following this idea, we could define
the privacy loss f as the expected success probability of C ’s
classification, or, alternatively, as the similarity between C ’s
classification and the real one (which can be formalized in
terms of cross entropy).
We assume that users obfuscate their locations within the
limits imposed by the utility constraint, and knowing that
they will be observed by the attacker. About the attacker we
assume that he can learn the obfuscation strategy deployed by
the users, and will use it to improve the precision of the re-
identification. This interplay between users and attacker can
be seen as an instance of a zero-sum Stackelberg game [1],
and modeled as the GANs mentioned above, where the users
are represented by G (the leader), the attacker by C (the
follower), and the payoff function f is the privacy loss
described above. From a formal point of view, finding the
2Such expected distance is known as distortion in information theory [4].
optimal point of equilibrium between G and C corresponds
to solving a minimax problem on f (G is the minimizer
and C the maximizer). The function f can be proved to be
convex/concave with respect to the strategies of G (obfusca-
tion) and C (re-identification) respectively, so from standard
game theory we know that there is a saddle point and that it
corresponds to the optimal obfuscation-re-identification pair.
The problem, however, is that it is difficult to reach the
saddle point via the typical back-and-forth interplay between
the two nets. Let us clarify this point with a simple example:
Example 1. Consider two users, Alice and Bob, in locations
a and b respectively. Assume that the first attempt of G
is to report their true locations (no noise). Then C will
learn that a corresponds to Alice and b to Bob. At the next
round, G will figure out that its best strategy to maximize the
misclassification error (given the choices of C ) is to swap
the locations, so that Alice reports b and Bob reports a.
Then, on its turn, C will have to “unlearn” the previous
classification and learn the new one. But then, at the next
round, G will again swap the locations, and bring the situation
back to the starting point, and so on, without ever reaching
an equilibrium. Note that the strategy of G in the equilibrium
point would be the mixed strategy that reports a for both Alice
and Bob 3 (in this situation C would not be able to do better
than random guessing), but G may not stop there. The problem
is that it is difficult to calibrate the training of G so that it
stops in proximity of the saddle point rather than continuing
all the way to reach its relative optimum. The situation is
illustrated in Fig.1a. The payoff function considered in this
figure is the success probability of the classification, but it
would be analogous if we considered, for instance, the cross
entropy between the true ids and C ’s prediction.
In order to address this issue, we propose to adopt a dif-
ferent target function, which is less sensitive to the particular
labeling strategy of C . The idea is to consider not just the
precision of the classification, but, rather, the information
contained in it, which represents the potential precision of an
ideal classifier that uses that information in the optimal way.
There are two main ways of formalizing this intuition: the
mutual information and the complement of the Bayes error.
More precisely, let X is the random variable associated to
the true ids, and Y be the random variable associated to
the ids resulting from the classification (predicted ids). We
consider the mutual information between X and Y , denoted
by I(X;Y ), which is defined as H(X) − H(X|Y ), where
H(X) is the entropy of X and H(X|Y ) is the residual entropy
of X given Y . The Bayes error, which we will denote by
B(X|Y ), is defined as the expected probability of error under
the MAP rule, which selects the value of X having maximum
aposteriori probability given the value of Y . Its complement
1−B(X|Y ), also known as (posterior) Bayes vulnerability [7],
3There are two more equilibrium points: one is when both Alice and Bob
report a or b with uniform probability, the other is when they both report
b. All the three strategies give the same payoff and we could choose any of
them to illustrate the issue.
2
C
aA
bB aAbA aBbB aBbA
G
Aa
Bb 1 0.5 0.5 0
... ... ... ... ...
G
Aa
Ba 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
... ... ... ... ...
Ab
Ba 0 0.5 0.5 1
(a) f = Expected success probability of the classification.
C
aA
bB aAbA aBbB aBbA
G
Aa
Bb 1 1 0 0.5 0 0.5 1 1
... ... ... ... ...
G
Aa
Ba 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5
... ... ... ... ...
Ab
Ba 1 1 0 0.5 0 0.5 1 1
(b) Bold: f = I(X;Y ). Hollow: f = 1−B(X|Y ).
Fig. 1: Payoff tables of the games between G and C in Example 1, for various payoff functions f . A stands for Alice and B
for Bob.
represents then the precision of an ideal classifier that makes
the best possible guess about the true id from the classification
produced by C .
If we set f to be I(X;Y ) or 1 − B(X|Y ), we obtain the
payoff table illustrated in Fig.1b. We note that the mimimum
f in the first and last columns corresponds now to a point of
equilibrium for any choice of C . This is not always the case,
but in general it is closer to the point of equilibrium and makes
the training of G more stable, in the sense that training G for
a longer time does not risk to increase the distance from the
equilibrium point.
In this paper we will use the mutual information to generate
the noise, but we will evaluate the level of privacy of the
resulting mechanism also in terms of the Bayes error. Both
notions have been used in the literature as privacy measures,
for instance mutual information has been applied to quantify
anonymity [8], [9]. The Bayes error and the Bayes vulnerabil-
ity have been considered in [7], [9]–[11], and they are strictly
related to the min-entropy leakage [12]. Mutual information
and Bayes error are related to each other by the Santhi-Vardy
bound [13]: B(X|Y ) ≤ 1− 2−H(X|Y ).
Another popular notion of privacy is differential pri-
vacy [14]. Its relation with mutual information has been
explored in [15], [16], while its relation with the Bayes
vulnerability has been investigated in [17].
A. Contribution
The contributions of the paper are the following:
• We propose an approach based on adversarial nets to
generate obfuscation mechanisms with a good tradeoff
between privacy and utility. The advantage of our method
with respect to the analytical methods from the literature
is twofold:
– we can handle much larger datasets, and
– we can handle complicated background knowledge
and correlation between data points.
• Although our approach is inspired by the GANs
paradigm, it departs significantly from it. In particular,
in our case, the distribution has to be “invented” rather
than “imitated”. This implies that we have to come up
with different techniques for evaluating a distribution. To
achieve our goal, we propose a new method based on
the mutual information between the supervised and the
predicted class labels.
• We apply our method to the case of location privacy.
We craft some experiments to shows in detail how
our approach works and how it can achieve optimality.
Depending on the distribution of data and on the utility
constraint, the resulting noise function may achieve the
maximal privacy, i.e., equivalent to that of random guess-
ing. Trivially, in this case it also achieves the optimal
tradeoff between privacy and utility.
• We evaluate the obfuscation mechanism produced by
our method on real location data from the the Gowalla
dataset, and compare the privacy and utility of our ap-
proach with that of the planar Laplacian, one of the most
popular mechanisms used in location privacy. First we do
the comparison using the adversarial classifier in our ar-
chitecture, obtaining favorable results. Then, we confirm
these results (and hence the advantages of our method)
by means of the (ideal) optimal Bayesian classifier, which
represents the strongest possible adversary.
• We have made publicly available the code of the im-
plementation and the experiments at the URL https:
//gitlab.com/MIPAN/mipan.
B. Related work
Optimal mechanisms, namely mechanisms providing an
optimal compromise between utility and privacy, have attracted
the interest of many researchers. Many of the studies so far
have focused on analytic methods based on linear optimization
[1], [2], [18], [19]. Although they can provide exact solutions,
the high complexity of linear optimization limits the scalability
of these methods. Our approach, in contrast, using the highly-
efficient optimization process of neural networks (the gradient
descent), does not suffer from this drawback.
The paper that is closest to ours is [20]. Its authors also
propose a GAN-based method to construct mechanisms pro-
viding an optimal privacy-utility trade-off, and they consider
notions of privacy and utility similar to ours. The main
difference is that the target function they use in the GAN
is the cross entropy rather than the mutual information (they
consider mutual information to measure privacy, but in the
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implementation they approximate it with the log loss, that is
the expected cross entropy). Hence the convergence of their
method may be problematic, at least when applied to our case
study, due to the “swapping effect” described in Example 1.
We have actually experimented with use cross entropy as target
function on our examples in Section IV, and the results were
unsatisfactory, in the sense that due to the lack of convergence
of C the resulting mechanisms were unstable and the level of
privacy protection was poor.
One of the side contributions of our paper is a method
to compute mutual information in neural network (cfr. Sec-
tion III). Recently, Belghazi et al. have proposed MINE, an ef-
ficient method to neural estimation of mutual information [21],
inspired by the framework of [22] for the estimation of a
general class of functions representable as f -divergencies.
These methods work also in the continuous case and for high-
dimensional data. In our case, however, we are dealing with
a discrete domain, and we can compute directly and exactly
the mutual information. Another reason for developing our
own method is that we need to deal with a loss functions that
contain not only the mutual information, but also a component
representing utility, and depending on the notion of utility the
result may not be an f -divergence.
Our paradigm has been inspired by the GANs [3], but it
comes with some fundamental differences:
• C is a classifier performing re-identification while in the
GANs there is a discriminator able to distinguish a real
data distribution from a generated one;
• in the GANs paradigm the generator network tries re-
produce the original data distribution to fool the dis-
criminator. A huge difference is that, in our adversarial
scenario, G does not have a model distribution to refer to.
The final data distribution only depends on the evolution
of the two networks over time and it is driven by the
constraints imposed in the loss functions that rule the
learning process.
• we still adopt a training algorithm which alternates
epochs of training of G and epochs of training of C ,
but as we will show in Section III, it is different from
the one adopted for GANs.
II. OUR SETTING
We formulate the privacy-utility optimization problem using
a framework similar to that of [23]. We consider four random
variables, X,Y, Z,W , ranging over the sets X ,Y,Z and W
respectively, with the following meaning:
• X: the sensitive information that the users wishes to
conceal,
• W : the useful information with respect to some service
provider and to the intended notion of utility,
• Z: the information made visible to the service provider,
which may be intercepted by some attacker, and
• Y : the information inferred by the attacker.
We assume a fixed joint distribution (data model) PX,W over
the users’ data X ×W . We present our framework assuming
Symbol Description
C Classifier network (attacker).
G Generator network.
X,X Sensitive information. (Random var. and domain.)
W,W Useful information with respect tothe intended notion of utility.
Z,Z Obfuscated information accessibleto the service provider and to the attacker.
Y,Y Information inferred by the attacker.
P·· Joint probability of two random variables.
P·|· Conditional probability.
PZ|W Obfuscation mechanism.
B(· | ·) Bayes error.
L[Z |W ] Utility loss induced by the obfuscation mechanism.
L Threshold on the utility loss.
H(·) Entropy of a random variable.
H(·|·) Conditional entropy.
I(·; ·) Mutual information between two random variables.
TABLE I: Table of symbols
that the variables are discrete, but all results and definitions
can be transferred to the continuous case, by replacing the
distributions with probability density functions, and the sum-
mations with integrals. For the initial definitions and results
of this section X and Y may be different sets. Starting from
Section III we will assume that X = Y .
An obfuscation mechanism can be represented as a condi-
tional probability distribution PZ|W , where PZ|W (z|w) indi-
cates the probability that the mechanism transform the data
point w into the noisy data point z. We assume that Z are
the only attributes visible to the attacker and to the service
provider. The goal of the defender G is to optimize the data
release mechanism PZ|W so to achieve a desired level of
utility while minimizing the leakage of the sensitive attributes
X . The goal of the attacker C is to retrieve X from Z as
precisely as possible. In doing so, it produces a classification
PY |Z (prediction).
Note that the four random variables form a Markov chain:
X ↔W ↔ Z ↔ Y. (1)
Their joint distribution is completely determined by the data
model, the obfuscation mechanism and the classification:
PX,W,Z,Y (x,w, z, y) = PX,W (x,w)PZ|W (z | w)PY |Z(y | z).
From PX,W,Z,Y we can derive the marginals, the conditional
probabilities of any two variables, etc. For instance:
PX(x) =
∑
w
PX,W (x,w). (2)
PZ(z) =
∑
xw
PX,W (x,w)PZ|W (z | w). (3)
PZ|X(z|x) =
∑
w PX,W (x,w)PZ|W (z | w)
PX(x)
. (4)
PX|Z(x|z) =
PZ|X(z|x)PX(x)
PZ(z)
. (5)
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The latter distribution, PX|Z , is the posterior distribution of
X given Z, and will play an important role in the following
sections.
A. Quantifying utility
Concerning the utility, we consider a loss function ` :W ×
Z → [0,∞), where `(w, z) represents the utility loss caused
by reporting z when the true value is w.
Definition 1 (Utility loss). The utility loss from the original
data W to the noisy data Z, given the loss function `, is
defined as the expectation of `:
L[Z |W, `] = E[` |W,Z] =
∑
wz
PW,Z(w, z)`(w, z). (6)
We will omit ` when it is clear from the context. Note that,
given a data model PX,W , the utility loss can be expressed in
terms of the mechanism PZ|W :
L[Z |W ] =
∑
xwz
PX,W (x,w)PZ|W (z|w)`(w, z). (7)
Our goal is to build a privacy-protection mechanism that keeps
the loss below a certain threshold L. We denote by ML the
set of such mechanisms, namely:
ML
def
= {PZ|W | L[Z |W ] ≤ L}. (8)
The following property is immediate:
Proposition 1 (Convexity of ML). The set ML is convex and
closed.
B. Quantifying privacy as mutual information
As explained in the introduction, the privacy leakage with
respect to an attacker C will be quantified by the mutual infor-
mation I(X;Y ), which represents the correlation between X
and the classification Y produced by C which the obfuscation
mechanism created by G tries to minimize. Let us remark once
more that considering the mutual information instead than the
classification precision allows us to capture the amount of
information provided by Y about X , and therefore the largest
possible class of adversaries given the information learned by
C, not just C. As pointed out in the introduction, this choice
makes the training of G more stable, since it is learning to
defeat not only C but all the adversaries that can be derived
from the information available through C. In other words, G
cannot simply try to win the game by swapping around the
labels of the classification learned by C: it needs to reduce
the information that reaches C.
To this purpose, we consider the following information-
theoretic functions:
Entropy
H(X) = −
∑
x
PX(x) logPX(x), (9)
Residual Entropy
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
xy
PX,Y (x, y) logPX|Y (x|y), (10)
Mutual Information
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ), (11)
C. Formulation of the game and equilibrium strategies
The game that G and C play corresponds to the following
minimax formulation:
min
G
max
C
I(X;Y ) (12)
where the minimization by G is on the mechanisms PZ|W
ranging over ML, while the maximization by C is on the
classifications PY |Z .
Note that PZ|W can be seen as a stochastic matrix and
therefore as an element of a vector space. An important
property for our purposes is that the mutual information is
convex with respect to PZ|W :
Proposition 2 (Convexity of I). Given PX,W and PY |Z , let
f(PZ|W ) = I(X;Y ). Then f is convex. Namely, given a pair
of convex coefficients c1 and c2, and two mechanisms P (1)Z|W
and P (2)
Z|W , we have:
f(c1P
(1)
Z|W + c2P
(2)
Z|W ) ≤ c1f(P (1)Z|W ) + c2f(P (2)Z|W ). (13)
Proposition 1 and 2 show that this problem is well defined:
for any choice of C, I(X;Y ) has a global minimum in ML,
and no strictly-local minima.
We note that, in principle, one could avoid using the
GAN paradigm, and try to achieve the optimal mechanism
by solving, instead, the following minimization problem:
min
G
I(X;Z) (14)
where minG I(X;Z) is meant, as before, as a minimization
over the mechanisms PZ|W ranging over ML. This approach
would have the advantage that it is independent from the
attacker, so one would need to reason only about G (and there
would be no need for a GAN).
The main difference between I(X;Y ) and I(X;Z) is that
the latter represents the information about X available to any
adversary, not only those that are trying to retrieve X by
building a classifier. This fact reflects in the following relation
between the two formulations:
Proposition 3.
min
G
max
C
I(X;Y ) ≤ min
G
I(X;Z)
Note that, since minG I(X;Z) is an upper bound of our
target, it imposes a limit on maxC I(X;Y ).
On the other hand, there are some advantages in considering
minG maxC I(X;Y ) instead than minG I(X;Z): first of
all, Z may have a much larger and more complicated domain
than Y , so performing the gradient descent on I(X;Z) could
be unfeasible. Second, if we are interested in considering
only classification-based attacks, then minG maxC I(X;Y )
should give a better result than minG I(X;Z). In this paper
we focus on the former, and leave the exploration of an
approach based on minG I(X;Z) as future work.
5
D. Measuring privacy as Bayes error
As explained in the introduction, we intend to evaluate the
resulting mechanism also in terms of Bayes error. Here we
give the relevant definitions and properties.
Definition 2 (Bayes error). The Bayes error of X given Y is:
B(X | Y ) =
∑
y
PY (y)(1−max
x
PX|Y (x | y)).
Namely, the Bayes error is the expected probability of
“guessing the wrong id” of an adversary that, when he sees
that C produces the id y, it guesses the id x that has the highest
posterior probability given y.
The definition of B(X | Z) is analogous. Given a mech-
anism PZ|W , we can regard B(X | Y ) as a measure of
privacy of PZ|W w.r.t. one-try [12] classification-based attacks,
whereas B(X | Z) measures privacy w.r.t. any one-try attack.
The following proposition shows the relation between the two
notions.
Proposition 4.
B(X | Z) ≤ B(X | Y )
Next, we propose an implementation via GANs of the
method illustrated above.
III. IMPLEMENTATION IN NEURAL NETWORKS
In this section we illustrate the network architecture and the
training algorithm that we propose to implement the interplay
between G and C . The scheme of our adversarial game is
illustrated in Fig. 2, where the meaning of the symbols is as
follows:
• x, y, z and w are instances of the random variables X ,Y ,
Z and W respectively, whose meaning is described in
previous section. In this section, and in the rest of teh
paper, we assume that the domains of X and Y coincide,
namely X = Y .
• s (seed) is a randomly-generated number in [0, 1).
• g is the function learnt by G , and it represents an
obfuscation mechanism PZ|W . The input s provides the
randomness needed to generate random noise. It is nec-
essary because a neural network in itself is deterministic.
• c is the classification learnt by C , and it corresponds to
PY |Z .
The evolution of the adversarial network is described in
Algorithm 1. C and G are trained at two different moments
within the same adversarial training iteration. In particular
Ci is obtained by training the network C against the noise
generated by Gi−1 and Gi is obtained by fighting against Ci .
Note that in our method each Ci is trained only on the
output from Gi−1 . This is a main difference with respect
to the GANs paradigm, where the discriminator is always
trained both over the output of the generator and the target
distribution. Another particularity of our method is that at the
end of the ith iteration, while Gi is retained for the next
G C
c(z, y)
((w, s), x) (g((w, s)), x) = (z, x)
final g(w, s)
Fig. 2: Scheme of the adversarial nets for our setting.
Data: train data // Training data
Models: Gi generator evolution at the i–th step;
Ci classifier evolution at the i–th step.
train(n, d) trains the network n on the data d.
generator(data) outputs a noisy version of data .
classifier = load model C0 = C0
generator = load model G0 = G0
i = 0
while True do
// Let PZ|W be the mechanism produced
by the current generator.
i += 1
classifier = train(classifier, generator(train data))
= Ci
// Train the classifier to produce
a PY |Z that approximates PX|Z.
adv network = generator + classifier in cascade
adv network = train(adv network, train data)
// Train the network to produce
a new PZ|W by reducing LossG.
The weights of the classifier are
frozen during this phase.
generator = generator layer in adv network = Gi
// Save generator evolution for
next iteration.
classifier = load model C0
// Reset classifier.
end
Algorithm 1: Adversarial algorithm with classifier reset.
iteration, Ci is discarded and the classifier is reinitialized
to the base one C0. The reason is that we have found out
experimentally that, if Ci is not reset, it might take a long
time before it becomes able to contrast the noise injection at
iteration (i+1)-th. In fact Ci has been trained on data generated
by Gi−1 and it has consistently updated its weights according
to that. It could take a long time for Ci to “forget” what
it has learned and move on to learning to beat the new noise
distribution. On the contrary, when the classifier is reset to C0,
it quickly adapts to the data produced by the new generator.
We describe now in more detail some key implementation
choices of our proposal.
A. Implementation details: Base models
The base model C0 is simply the “blank” classifier that
has not learnt anything yet. As for G0, we have found out
experimentally that it is convenient to start with a noise
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function pretty much spread out. This is because in this way
the generator has more data points with non-null probability
to consider, and can figure out faster which way to go to
minimize the mutual information.
B. Implementation details: Utility
The utility constraint is incorporated in the loss function of
G in the following way:
LossG = α× Lossutility + β × I(X;Y ), (15)
where α and β are parameters that allow us to tune the trade-
off between utility and privacy. The purpose of Lossutility
is to ensure that the constraint on utility is respected, i.e.,
that the obfuscation mechanism that G is trying to produce
stays within the domain ML. We recall that ML represents
the constraint L[Z | W ] ≤ L (cfr. (8)). Since we need to
compute the gradient on the loss, we need a derivable function
for Lossutility . We propose to implement it using softplus ,
which is a function of two arguments in R defined as:
softplus(a, b) = ln(1 + e(a−b)). (16)
This function is non negative, monotonically increasing, and
its value is close to 0 for a < b, while it grows very quickly
for a > b. Hence, we define
Lossutility(PZ|W ) = softplus(L[Z |W ], L). (17)
With this definition, Lossutility does not interfere with
I(X;Y ) when the constraint L[Z |W ] ≤ L is respected, and
it forces G to stay within the constraint because its growth
when the constraints is not respected is very steep.
C. Implementation details: Mutual Information
One of the characteristics of our work is that the loss
function is based on the mutual information between the
supervised and the predicted class labels. We show how it
is computed via an example. Assume we are at the i-th
iteration. Let us consider the scenario illustrated in Table II,
that describes a classification problem over three classes A,
B, and C, and six samples. The X and W columns represent
the true values of the data, and the Z column represents the
obfuscated version of W , generated by Gi. The Y = · columns
represent the labels predicted by Ci on the Z values of the
samples. These are the result of the training of the classifier on
the output of Gi−1, the generator at the previous iteration. The
numbers in the Y = · columns represent the confidence of the
prediction (as produced by the softmax activation functions),
and can be interpreted as probabilities.
In order to compute the mutual information we need to
calculate H(X) and H(X | Y ), using their defining for-
mulae (9) and (10), and then apply (11). To this purpose,
we just need to find out the joint distribution PX,Y , since
the marginals PX and PY , and the conditional probability
PX|Y , can be then obtained from PX,Y in the standard
way. Now, the value of PX,Y (x, y) can be computed as the
average of the probabilities over the samples. Specifically,
we obtain: PX,Y (A,A) = 2×0.7/6, PX,Y (A,B) = 2×0.3/6,
W X Z Y = A Y = B Y = C
w0 A z0 0.7 0.3 0.0
w1 A z0 0.7 0.3 0.0
w1 B z0 0.7 0.3 0.0
w1 B z1 0.0 0.5 0.5
w2 C z1 0.0 0.5 0.5
w3 C z2 0.0 0.0 1.0
TABLE II: Classification problem with three classes A, B, C.
Predicted labels
Class 0 Class 1 Class 2
Tr
ue
la
be
ls Class 0 i00 i01 i02
Class 1 i10 i11 i12
Class 2 i20 i21 i22
TABLE III: Confusion matrix for a 3-class classification pb.
PX,Y (A,C) = 0, PX,Y (B,A) = 0.7/6, PX,Y (B,B) =
0.3+0.5/6, PX,Y (B,C) = 0.5/6, PX,Y (C,B) = 0.5/6 and
PX,Y (C,C) = 0.5+1/6.
In order to make the function work with the back propaga-
tion algorithm, we implemented all the steps using TensorFlow
and Keras native functions: summation, multiplication, loga-
rithm, condition, while loop.
D. Implementation details: Metrics to evaluate the classifica-
tion outcome
To evaluate the quality of the classification produced by the
C network, we rely on two metrics: accuracy and F1 score.
To explain their meaning, let us consider a three class
problem and the corresponding confusion matrix in table III,
where the main diagonal represents the number of matches
between the true labels and the predicted ones, while all the
other cells represent the mismatches.
The accuracy4 is:
Accuracy
def
=
i00 + i11 + i22∑2
j,k=0 ijk
. (18)
The F1 score involves the notion of precision and recall. These
are defined on each class:
Precisionj
def
=
ijj
i0j + i1j + i2j
. (19)
Recall j
def
=
ijj
ij0 + ij1 + ij2
. (20)
F1 scorej
def
= 2 ∗ Precisionj ∗Recallj
Precisionj +Recallj
. (21)
The global F1 score is defined as the weighted average of
the F1 score’s for each class. In the simplest case, when the
4For simplicity we give the definition for the case in which the elements
of the dataset are equally distributed among all the classes. If this is not the
case, the definition of accuracy is more complicated.
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classes in the dataset are balanced, we can define it as the
simple average. In the above example it would be:
F1 score
def
=
1
3
2∑
j=0
F1 scorej . (22)
In case the classes are unbalanced more elaborated definitions
should be applied. Typically, we could assign to each class a
weight inversely proportional to the frequency of the class.
Both the accuracy and the F1 score take values ∈ [0, 1].
It is important to consider both of them to avoid issues like
the accuracy paradox: a classifier always predicting the most
frequent class could be accurate but it could totally neglect
those classes which are not very frequent. Furthermore, even
in case of balanced datasets, considering the F1 score, and
therefore the precision and recall, may be useful in case of
low accuracy, to understand if all the classes are misclassified
or some are wrongly predicted more often than others.
E. Implementation details: number of epochs and batch size
The convergence of the game can be quite sensitive to the
number of epochs and batch size. We refer to literature [24] for
a general discussion about the impact they have on learning.
It is important to note that:
• Choosing a batch size too small for training G might
result in a constraint on the utility too strict. In fact,
since the utility loss is an expectation, a larger number of
samples makes it more likely that some points are pushed
further than the threshold, taking advantage of the fact
that their loss may be compensated by other data points
for which the loss is small.
• Training C for too few epochs might result into a too
weak adversary. On the other hand if it is trained for
a long time we should make sure that the classification
performances do not drop over the validation and test set
because that might indicate an overfitting problem.
F. On the convergence of our method
In principle, at a each iteration i, our method relies on
the ability of the network Gi to improve the obfuscation
mechanism starting from the one produced by Gi−1, and
given only the original locations and the model Ci, which are
used to determine the direction of the gradient for LossG .
The classifier Ci is a particular adversary modeled by its
weights and its biases. However, thanks to the fact that the
main component of LossG is I(X;Y ) and not the the cross
entropy, Gi takes into account all the attacks that would
be possible from Ci’s information. We have experimentally
verified that indeed, using the mutual information rather than
the cross entropy, determines a substantial improvement on the
convergence process, and the resulting mechanisms provide a
better privacy (for the same utility level). Again, the reason is
that the the cross entropy would be subject to the “swapping
effect” illustrated by Example 1 in the introduction.
Another improvement on the convergence is due the fact
that we reset the classifier to the initial weight setting (C0) at
each iteration, instead than letting Ci evolve from Ci−1. We
have experimentally verified that the precision of Ci improves
more rapidly if we start from an “agnostic” situation rather
than from the knowledge accumulated in previous steps. This
is, intuitively, due to the fact that the noise produced by G
may change substantially from an iteration to the next, hence
Ci would have to “unlearn” the now obsolete information of
Ci−1, if the latter were its starting point.
The loss function that the network G has to minimize,
LossG , is a combination of a softplus for the utility loss
(which is convex) and the mutual information which is convex
in PZ|W , i.e., our obfuscation mechanism. This means that
there are only global minima, although there can be many of
them, all equivalent. Therefore for sufficiently small updates,
the noise distribution modeled by PZ|W converges to one
of these optima, provided that the involved network has
enough capacity to compute the gradient descent involved in
the training algorithm. In practice, however, the network G
represents a limited family of noise distributions, and instead
of optimizing the noise distribution itself we optimize the
weights of this network, which introduces multiple critical
points in the parameter space.
IV. EXPERIMENTS ON SYNTHETIC DATA
In this section we illustrate some experiments on artificial
data to show how the proposed method works. We consider
the issue of location privacy, namely, we assume a set of
users who want to protect their identities, but need to disclose
(an obfuscated version of) their locations, for some utility
purpose. Following Definition 6, the utility loss is the expected
distortion introduced by the obfuscation mechanism, i.e., the
expected distance between the true location and the obfuscated
one. To keep things simple, we consider just four users. In
order to be consistent with the experiments on real data, we
assume the same set of locations of the next section, namely
locations in an area of Paris.
More precisely, with reference to the setting in Section II,
we instantiate the domains of the random variables X,W,Z,
and Y , and the loss function, as follows:
• X = Y = {blue, red , green, yellow}, the identities of 4
users.
• Z = W = the locations in a squared region of 6.5 ×
6.5 sq km centered in 5, Boulevard de Se´bastopol, Paris.
Each location entry is defined by a pair of coordinates
normalized in [−1, 1].
• `(w, z) = geographical distance5 between w and z.
The goal is to produce an obfuscation mechanism that
achieves a good trade-off between utility and privacy. Though
the various experiments, we will compare our method with
that of the planar Laplace mechanism associated to geo-
indistinguishability [5], which is rather popular in the domain
of location privacy.
5For simplicity in this paper we use the Euclidean distance rather than the
Haversine distance. For such limited area they are quite close anyway.
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A. The planar Laplace mechanism
We recall that the planar Laplace probability density
function in the point z, given that the true location is w, is
defined as [5]:
Lw(z) =
2
2pi
e− d(w,z), (23)
where d(w, z) is the Euclidean distance between w and z.
In order to compare the the above mechanism with our one,
we need to tune the privacy parameter  so that L has the same
expected distortion as the upper bound L to the utility loss
applied in our method, and then confront the privacy degree
of the two corresponding mechanisms. To this purpose, we
recall that the expected distortion L[Z |W ] introduced by the
planar Laplace depends only on  (not on the prior PW ), and
it is given by:
L[Z |W ] =
∑
wz
Lw(z)PW (w)d(w, z) = 2

. (24)
B. Bayes error estimation
As explained in Section II, besides I(X;Y ) we will also use
the Bayes error B(X | Z) to evaluate the level of protection
offered by a mechanism.
To this purpose, we discretize Z by creating a grid over the
6.5 × 6.5 sq km region, thus determining a partition of the
region into a number of disjoint cells. We will create different
grid settings to see how the partition affects the Bayes error.
In particular, we will consider the cases where the side of a
cell is 25m, 50m, 100m and 500m long, which corresponds
to 260× 260 = 67600, 130× 130 = 16900, 65× 65 = 4225
and 13× 13 = 169 cells, respectively.
We will also run various experiments with different numbers
of obfuscated locations (hits) created for each original one.
Specifically, for each grid we will consider the cases of 10,
100, 200 and 500 obfuscated hits for each original one.
Each hit falls in exactly one cell. Hence, we can estimate
the probability that a hit is in cell i as:
P (celli)
def
=
number of hits in cell i
total number of hits
, (25)
and the probability that a hit in cell i belong to class j as:
P (Classj |celli) def= number of hits of classj in celli
number of hits in cell i
,
(26)
We can now estimate of the Bayes error as follows:
B(X | Z) def= 1−
k−1∑
i=0
max
j
P (Classj |celli)P (celli) (27)
where k is the total number of cells.
It is important to stress the fact that the results of these
computations are influenced by the chosen grid. In particular
we have two extreme cases:
• when the grid consists of only one cell the Bayesian error
is 1− 1/k = k−1/k for any obfuscation mechanism PZ|W .
• when the number of cells is large enough so that each
cell contains at most one hit, then Bayesian error is 0 for
any obfuscation mechanism.
In general, a coarser granularity is a source of additional Bayes
error, independently from the obfuscation mechanisms. A finer
granularity guarantees higher discrimination power, especially
when we compare methods which scatter the obfuscated
locations in different regions of the domain.
C. The synthetic dataset
The synthetic dataset consists of 600 locations (true loca-
tions) for each of the 4 users (classes) blue, red , green and
yellow . Hence we are in a situation of balanced classes, and
in total we have 2400 entries. The locations of each user are
placed around one of the vertices of a square of 300× 300 sq
meters centered in 5, Boulevard de Se´bastopol, Paris. (Each
user corresponds to a different vertex.) They are randomly
generated so to form a cloud of 600 entries around each
vertex and in such a way that no locations falls further than
about 45m from the corresponding vertex. Note that these
distributions determine the random variables X and W , and
their correlation.
For each user, 480 locations will be used for training and
validation purposes, whilst 120 will be used for testing (480+
120 = 600). Therefore there are 1920 locations in the set used
for training and validation, and 480 for testing. These sets are
represented in Fig. 13(b) and Fig. 3(b), respectively.
D. Experiment 1: Synthetic data, relaxed utility constraint
As a first experiment, we choose for the upper bound L
on the expected distortion a value high enough so that in
principle we can achieve the highest possible privacy, which is
obtained when the obfuscated location observed by the attacker
gives no information about the true location, which means that
I(X;Y ) = 0. When this is the case, the best the attacker can
do is random guessing. Since we have 4 users, the Bayes risk
is B(X | Y ) = 1− 1/4 = 0.75.
One way to achieve the maximum privacy is to map all the
locations into the same obfuscated location in the middle. To
compute a sufficient L, consider that the vertices where the
locations of the users are placed form a square of side 300m,
hence each vertex is at a distance 300×√2/2 ≈ 212m from the
center. Taking into account that the locations can be as much
as 45m away from the corresponding vertex, we conclude that
any value of L larger than 212+45 = 247m should be enough
to allow us to obtain the maximum privacy. Just to be sure,
we set the upper bound on the distortion to be
L = 270m, (28)
but we will see from the experiments that a much smaller
value of L would have been sufficient.
We now need to tune the planar Laplace so that the expected
distortion is at least L. We decide to set:
 =
ln 2
100
(29)
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which, using Equation (24), gives us a value
L[Z |W ] ≈ 288m > L. (30)
We have actually used this instance of the planar Laplace
also as a starting point of our method: we have defined G0
as L with  = ln 2/100. For the following steps, the networks
Gi and Ci are constructed as explained in Algorithm 1. In
particular, we train the generator with a batch size of 128
samples for 100 epochs during each iteration. The learning
rate is set to 0.0001. For this particular experiment we set the
weight for the utility loss to 1 and the weight for the mutual
information to 2. The classifier is trained with a batch size of
512 samples and 3000 epochs for each iteration. The learning
rate for the classifier is set to 0.001.
Around iteration i = 149 the accuracy of the network Ci
tends to a value which is ≈ 0.25 both over the training and the
validation set. This means that Ci just randomly predicts one
of the four classes. This happens because the noise injection
results to be effective, and the Ci cannot learn anything from
the training set. Since 0.75 is the maximum possible Bayes
risk, we then know that we can stop.
The result of the application of the planar Laplace to
the testing set is illustrated in Fig. 3(a). In the appendix
we report also the result on the testing set (Fig. 13(a)).
The empirical distortion (i.e., the distortion computed on the
sampled obfuscated locations) is ≈ 282.07m for the training
data and ≈ 298.40m for the testing data, respectively, which
is in line with the theoretical distortion formulated in (30).
The result of the application of our method, i.e. the final
generator Gi, to the testing and training sets, are reported in
Fig. 3(c) and 13(c), respectively. The empirical distortion for
the training and testing sets is ≈ 219.70m and ≈ 219.26m,
respectively. This is way below the limit of 270m set in (28),
and it is due to the fact that to achieve the optimum privacy we
probably do not need more than ≈ 220m. In fact, the distance
of the vertices from the center is ≈ 212m, and even though
some locations are further away (up to 45m more), there are
also locations that are closer, and that compensate the utility
loss (which is a linear average measure).
From Fig. 3 and 13 we can see that, while the Laplace tends
to “spread out” the obfuscated locations, our method tends to
concentrate them into a small area. This may not be possibile
in general, as it depends on the utility constraint. Nevertheless,
we can expect that our mechanism will tend to overlap the
obfuscated locations of different classes, as much as allowed
by the utility constraint. With the Laplace, on the contrary, the
areas of the various classes remain pretty separated. This is
reflected by the Bayes error estimation reported in Fig. 5.
We note that the Bayes error of the planar Laplace tend
to decrease as the grid becomes finer. We believe that this is
due to the fact that, with a coarse grid, there is an effect of
confusion simply due to the large size of each cell. We remark
that the behavior of our noise, on the contrary, is quite stable.
It is also interesting to note that, when the grid is very coarse
(13× 13 cells) the Bayes error is 0.75 already on the original
data (cfr. Fig. 4), which must be due to the fact that all the
vertices are in the same cell. While the Bayes error remains
0.75 also with our obfuscation mechanism, with the Laplacian
it decreases to 0.60. The reason is that the noise scatters
the locations in different cells, and they become, therefore
distinguishable.
E. Experiment 2: Synthetic data, stricter utility constraint
We are now interested in investigating how our method
behave when a stricter constraint on the utility loss is imposed.
In order to do so, we run an experiment similar to the one
in Section IV-D. We repeat the same steps but now we set
L and the privacy parameter (and consequently the distortion
rate) of the planar Laplace as follows:
L = 173m  =
ln 2
60
L[Z |W ] ≈ 173.12m (31)
The result of the application of the Laplace mechanism is
illustrated in Fig. 6(a) (testing data) and 14(a) (training data),
respectively. The empirical distortion is ≈ 170, 53m for the
training data, and ≈ 172.35m for the testing data.
Following the same pattern as in Section IV-D, we train an
adversarial network G and C . The training of the network
G is performed for 30 epochs during each iteration with a
batch size of 512 samples and a learning rate of 0.0001. The
classifier network C is trained for 3000 epochs with a batch
size of 512 samples and 0.001 as the value for the learning rate
during each iteration. We are particularly interested in the 24th
iteration where the network C ’s performance is degraded by
the obfuscation performed by the generator trained during the
previous iteration. Training C with 32 samples batch size and
learning rate set to 0.001 for 100 epochs with the obfuscated
data gives the results reported in Table IV.
Data Accuracy F1 score
Training data ≈ 0.55 ≈ 0.54
Validation data ≈ 0.53 ≈ 0.53
Test data ≈ 0.52 ≈ 0.51
TABLE IV: Summary of the experiment with our noise.
In this case, increasing the number of epochs does not
improve the classification precision and makes the network
C more prone to overfitting.
The obfuscation provided by the network G at the 24th
iteration produces the distributions on the testing and train-
ing data illustrated in Fig. 6(c) and Fig. 14(c) respectively.
The empirical distortion is ≈ 166.78m (training data) and
≈ 171.50m (testing data).
Finally, we have estimated the Bayes error for the two
mechanisms. The results are in Fig. 7.
10
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
scaled latitude
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
sc
al
ed
 lo
ng
itu
de
(a)
0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04
scaled latitude
0.04
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
sc
al
ed
 lo
ng
itu
de
(b)
0.025 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021
scaled latitude
0.007
0.006
0.005
0.004
0.003
0.002
0.001
0.000
sc
al
ed
 lo
ng
itu
de
(c)
Fig. 3: Synthetic testing data. From left to right: Laplacian noise, no noise, our noise. L = 270m.
Number of cells
13× 13 65× 65 130× 130 260× 260
0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00
(a) Training data.
Number of cells
13× 13 65× 65 130× 130 260× 260
0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00
(b) Testing data.
Fig. 4: Estimation of B(X | Z) on the original version of the synthetic data.
Number of cells
13× 13 65× 65 130× 130 260× 260
Obf Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our
10 0.60 0.75 0.40 0.75 0.38 0.75 0.35 0.73
100 0.60 0.75 0.41 0.75 0.40 0.75 0.39 0.74
200 0.60 0.75 0.41 0.75 0.40 0.75 0.39 0.74
500 0.60 0.75 0.41 0.75 0.40 0.75 0.40 0.74
(a) Training data.
Number of cells
13× 13 65× 65 130× 130 260× 260
Obf Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our
10 0.59 0.75 0.38 0.75 0.36 0.75 0.26 0.73
100 0.60 0.75 0.40 0.75 0.39 0.75 0.37 0.74
200 0.60 0.75 0.41 0.75 0.39 0.75 0.38 0.74
500 0.60 0.75 0.41 0.75 0.40 0.75 0.39 0.74
(b) Testing data.
Fig. 5: Estimation of B(X | Z) on the synthetic data for the Laplacian and for our mechanisms, with L = 270m. The empirical
utility loss is ≈ 282.07m− 298.40m for the Laplacian and ≈ 219.70m− 219.26m for ours.
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Fig. 6: Synthetic testing data. From left to right: Laplacian noise, no noise, our noise. L = 173m.
Number of cells
13× 13 65× 65 130× 130 260× 260
Obf Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our
10 0.64 0.74 0.26 0.45 0.23 0.43 0.22 0.41
100 0.64 0.74 0.26 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42
200 0.64 0.74 0.26 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.42
500 0.64 0.74 0.26 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.42
(a) Training data.
Number of cells
13× 13 65× 65 130× 130 260× 260
Obf Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our
10 0.63 0.74 0.25 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39
100 0.64 0.74 0.26 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42
200 0.64 0.74 0.26 0.45 0.23 0.43 0.23 0.42
500 0.64 0.74 0.26 0.45 0.23 0.43 0.23 0.42
(b) Testing data
Fig. 7: Estimation of B(X | Z) on the synthetic data for the Laplacian and for our mechanisms, with L = 173m. The empirical
utility loss is ≈ 170.53m – 172.35m for the Laplacian and ≈ 166.78m – 171.50m for ours.
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Fig. 8: Gowalla testing data. From left to right: Laplacian noise, no noise, our noise. L = 1150m.
Number of cells
13× 13 65× 65 130× 130 260× 260
0.12 0.06 0.04 0.03
(a) Training data.
Number of cells
13× 13 65× 65 130× 130 260× 260
0.11 0.04 0.03 0.03
(b) Testing data.
Fig. 9: Estimation of B(X | Z) on the original version of the data from Gowalla.
Number of cells
13× 13 65× 65 130× 130 260× 260
Obf Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our
10 0.56 0.83 0.37 0.83 0.19 0.82 0.06 0.80
100 0.57 0.83 0.53 0.83 0.46 0.82 0.31 0.81
200 0.57 0.83 0.55 0.83 0.50 0.82 0.40 0.81
500 0.57 0.83 0.56 0.83 0.54 0.82 0.48 0.81
(a) Training data.
Number of cells
13× 13 65× 65 130× 130 260× 260
Obf Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our
10 0.51 0.83 0.18 0.82 0.07 0.80 0.01 0.79
100 0.56 0.83 0.45 0.82 0.30 0.81 0.13 0.80
200 0.56 0.83 0.49 0.82 0.38 0.81 0.21 0.80
500 0.56 0.83 0.53 0.82 0.46 0.81 0.33 0.80
(b) Testing data.
Fig. 10: Estimation of B(X | Z) on the Gowalla data for the Laplacian and for our mechanisms, with L = 1150m. The utility
loss for training and testing data is ≈ 1127.83m− 1132.63m for the Laplacian and ≈ 961.38m− 979.40m for ours.
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Fig. 11: Gowalla testing data. From left to right: Laplacian noise, no noise, our noise. L = 518m.
Number of cells
13× 13 65× 65 130× 130 260× 260
Obf Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our
10 0.38 0.50 0.29 0.42 0.20 0.37 0.27 0.08
100 0.39 0.51 0.36 0.44 0.34 0.43 0.27 0.40
200 0.39 0.51 0.36 0.44 0.35 0.43 0.31 0.41
500 0.38 0.51 0.37 0.44 0.36 0.43 0.34 0.42
(a) Training data.
Number of cells
13× 13 65× 65 130× 130 260× 260
Obf Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our Lap Our
10 0.34 0.47 0.20 0.36 0.08 0.35 0.03 0.12
100 0.37 0.49 0.32 0.41 0.25 0.38 0.15 0.32
200 0.37 0.48 0.33 0.41 0.30 0.39 0.21 0.35
500 0.37 0.49 0.35 0.42 0.32 0.40 0.28 0.38
(b) Testing data.
Fig. 12: Estimation of B(X | Z) on the Gowalla data for the Laplacian and for our mechanisms, with L = 518m. The utility
loss fort training and testing data is ≈ 523.40m− 535.21m for the Laplacian and ≈ 487.34m− 502.89m for ours.
12
V. EXPERIMENTS ON DATA FROM THE GOWALLA DATASET
We present now similar experiments, but performed on real
location data.
A. The dataset
The dataset consists of data extracted from the Gowalla
dataset [25], a collection of check-ins made available by
the Gowalla location-based social network. Among all the
provided features, only the users’ identifiers (classes), the
latitude and longitude of the check-in locations are considered.
The data are selected as follows:
1) we consider a squared region centered in 5, Boulevard
de Se´bastopol, Paris, France with 4500m long side;
2) we select the 6 users who checked in the region most
frequently, we retain their locations and discard the rest;
3) we filter the obtained locations to reduce the overlapping
of the data belonging to different classes by randomly
selecting for each class 82 location samples for training
and validation purpose, and 20 samples for the test.
We obtain 492 locations to train and validate the model, and
120 to test it. Fig. 8(b) and 15(b) show the distribution of the
testing and training data, respectively. Each color corresponds
to a different class, i.e. a different user.
B. Experiment 3: Gowalla data, relaxed utility constraint
In this experiment we study the case of a large upper bound
on the utility loss, which would potentially allow to achieve
the maximum utility. We set L and the privacy parameter (and
consequently L[Z |W ]) of the planar Laplace as follows:
L = 1150m  =
ln 2
400
L[Z |W ] ≈ 1154.15m (32)
The results of the application of the Laplace and of our method
are illustrated in Fig. 8 (testing data) and 15 (training data).
As we can see, the utility constraint is relaxed enough to allow
our method to achieve the maximum privacy. As reported in
Fig. 10, indeed, the Bayes error is close to that of random
guess, namely 1 − 1/6 ≈ 0.82. Fig. 9 shows the part of
the Bayes error due to the discretization of teh domain Z .
The planar Laplace, on the other hand, confirms the relatively
limited level of privacy as observed in the synthetic data.
C. Experiment 4: Gowalla data, stricter utility constraint
We consider now a much tighter utility constraint, and we
set the parameters of the planar Laplace as follows:
L = 518m  =
ln 2
180
L[Z |W ] ≈ 519.37m (33)
The results of the application of the Laplace and of our
method are shown in Fig. 11 (testing data) and 16 (training
data), and the Bayes error is reported in Fig. 12.
It is interesting to note that, as the grid becomes finer, both
the planar Laplace and our method become more sensitive to
the number of samples, in the sense that the (approximation of)
the Bayes error grows considerably as the number of samples
increases. We think that this is a phenomenon due to the way
the Bayes error is estimated: when the cells are small they tend
to have a limited number of hits, and therefore the number of
hits whose class is not selected as the most present (in the
given cell) is limited. Note that these less present hits are
those that contribute to the Bayes error.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a method based on adversarial nets to
generate obfuscation mechanisms with a good tradeoff be-
tween privacy and utility. The crucial feature of our approach is
that the target function to minimize is the mutual information
rather than the cross entropy. We have applied our method
to the case of location privacy, and experimented with a
set of synthetic data and with data from Gowalla. We have
compared the mechanism obtained via our approach with
the planar Laplacian, the typical mechanism used for geo-
indistinguishability, obtaining favorable results.
In the future we plan to explore other neural-network-
based approaches to the construction of utility-aware privacy
mechanisms. In particular, we intend to explore the possibility
of using a loss function that depends on the intrinsic leakage of
information of the mechanism, rather than on its vulnerability
with respect to some adversary, and we intend to investigate
the possibility of capturing different notions of privacy, such
as differential privacy [14] and g-leakage [26].
Moreover we plan to enhance the flexibility of the constraint
on distortion (in the loss function), by requiring it to be per
user rather than global. More specifically, we aim at producing
obfuscation mechanisms that satisfy constraints stating that
the expected displacement for each user is at most up to a
certain threshold. The motivation is that different users may
have different requirements. Another potential application is
to encompass a notion of fairness, that can be obtained by
requiring that the threshold is the same for everybody.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Proofs of the results in the paper
Proposition 2 (Convexity of I). Given PX,W and PY |Z , let
f(PZ|W ) = I(X;Y ). Then f is convex. Namely, given a pair
of convex coefficients c1 and c2, and two mechanisms P (1)Z|W
and P (2)
Z|W , we have:
f(c1P
(1)
Z|W + c2P
(2)
Z|W ) ≤ c1f(P (1)Z|W ) + c2f(P (2)Z|W ). (13)
Proof. Let us recall that
X ↔W ↔ Z ↔ Y. (34)
represents a Markov chain where:
• the relation between the two random variables X and W
is defined by the data distribution PX,W ,
• the relation between Z and Y depends only on the chosen
classifier according to PY |Z ,
• the relation between Z and W can be described by the
variable PZ|W
If we consider X as the secret input and Y as the observable
output of a stochastic channel, the mutual information between
the two random variable can be expressed as
I(X;Y ) = g(PY |X). (35)
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We know from [4] that g(·) is a convex function with respect
to PY |X . According to the theory of Markov chains, we can
express PY |X as:
PY |X(y|x) =
∑
zw PX,W (x,w)PZ|W (z|w)PY |Z(y|z)∑
w PX,W (x,w)
. (36)
Eq. 36 represents a linear function of the variable PZ|W
(all the other probabilities are constant). Hence f(PZ|W ) =
g(h(PZ|W )) where g(·) is convex and h(·) is linear. It is
known that the composition of a convex function with a linear
one is a convex function and this concludes the proof.
Proposition 3.
min
G
max
C
I(X;Y ) ≤ min
G
I(X;Z)
Proof. Let us prove that I(X;Z) is an upper bound for
maxC I(X;Y ). Given that eq. (1) represents a Markov chain,
X ↔ Z ↔ Y. (37)
represents one as well. For the data processing inequality it is
possible to assert that
I(X;Y ) ≤ I(X;Z). (38)
It follows that
max
C
I(X;Y ) ≤ I(X;Z). (39)
and therefore
min
G
max
C
I(X;Y ) ≤ min
G
I(X;Z). (40)
concluding the proof.
Proposition 4.
B(X | Z) ≤ B(X | Y )
Proof.
B(X | Z) = ∑z PZ(z)(1−maxx PX|Z(x | z))
= 1−∑z PZ(z)maxx PX|Z(x | z)
= 1−∑z PZ(z)∑y PY |Z(y|z)maxx PX|Z(x | z)
= 1−∑y PY (y)∑z PZ|Y (z|y)maxx PX|Z(x | z)
≤ 1−∑y PY (y)maxx∑z PZ|Y (z|y)PX|Z(x | z)
= 1−∑y PY (y)maxx PX|Y (x | y)
= B(X | Y )
B. Results of the experiments on the training sets
The results of the experiments on the training sets of the
synthetic data and on the Gowalla data are illustrated in
Fig. 13, 14, 15 and 16.
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Fig. 13: Synthetic training data. From left to right: Laplacian noise, no noise, our noise. L = 270m.
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Fig. 14: Synthetic training data. From left to right: Laplacian noise, no noise, our noise. L = 173m.
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Fig. 15: Gowalla training data. From left to right: Laplacian noise, no noise, our noise. L = 1150m.
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Fig. 16: Gowalla training data. From left to right: Laplacian noise, no noise, our noise. L = 518m.
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